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of the State of Utah
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THOMAS F. KIRKHAM, Administrator of the Estate of William Kirkham,
Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 8291

vs.
ORIEN A. SPENCER and VIOLA
SPENCER, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

U. ilt 1~

I

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

'•V
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
j[j_ II

The Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set
out in appellants' brief, but deem it necessary to make a more
detailed statement concerning the evidence and testimony of
the witnesses than was contained in said brief. We will, therefore, undertake to set forth the facts as developed by both
parties.
The Respondent was granted judgment on his complaint
on file herein for unlawful detainer in the Fourth Judicial District Court. From this judgment the defendants appealed.
3
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The facts are as follows:
That on or about January 25, 1952, the deceased, William
Kirkham, entered into a written contract of sale of real property to the defendants, Orien A. Spencer and Viola Spencer,
his wife, which property is the subject of this action and is
correctly described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. The
contract provided for payment by the purchasers of $65.00
per month, or more, commencing on February 1, 1952, together with interest at 5% per annum on the unpaid balance.
The monthly payments were to be applied first to interest
upon the unpaid balance, and then the balance being applied
to principal. The defendants went into possession under the
contract, the original of which is plaintiff's exhibit A in the
record, and have continued to occupy the pretnises since that
time.
Pretrial was held on the 8th day of October, 1954, wherein
the parties were properly represented by their counsel. A stipulation was entered into by counsel and accepted by the Court
through a pre-trial order. It was stipulated among other things
that the plaintiff, Thomas F. Kirkham, is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting administrator of the Estate of William
Kirkham, deceased, having been appointed on October 2,
1953. That the contract of sale hereinbefore described is accurate. The only issue of fact reserved for trial was stated in the
pretrial order as follows:
" ( 1) Did the defendants pay to the plaintiff's decedent during the month of August, 1953, the sum
of $4800.00."
The evidence pertinent to this issue presented at trial is

4
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as follows: Plaintiff Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator of
the Estate of William Kirkham, deceased, testified that he was
a brother of the deceased; that he made up the contracts, made
all interest calculations; made his bank deposits and acted as
consultant on many business deals for 10 years or more for
the deceased; and that this relationship lasted up until the
death of William Kirkham (Tr. P. 4).
Plaintiff's exhibit C is the bank book of the deceased showing deposits from 1942 to September 5, 1953 and plaintiff
testified that he made all of those deposits (Tr. P. 5).
William Kirkham died on September 6, 1953 as a result
of a sudden stroke.
Plaintiff further testified that he went on vacation m
August, 195 ;, and returned home August 22, 195 3, the day
after the date shown on defendants' exhibit 3. Two or three days
later William Kirkham came to him and expressed a concern
about the delinquent Spencer contract. Plaintiff recommended
that he quit worrying and turn the contract over to the attorney
he had before for collection (Tr. P. 9). That the papers
were delivered about a week after his return from vacation
to Attorney Harvard R. Hinton with instructions to collect
the same, making the date of delivery approximately August
30, 1953 (Tr. P. 10, 11).
That as administrator he collected the assets of the estate
and filed an inventory; that he did not collect $4800.00, nor
was any large sum of money found in deceased's assets or
belongings (Tr. P. 12) and that no other bank account was
ever found in the name of the decedent ( T r. P. 13) .

5
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That plaintiff always prepared deeds for his brother's
real estate transactions and that he was never requested by
his brother to prepare any deed for defendants nor was he
ever requested to make any interest calculations in regard to
payment of the Spencer contract (Tr. P. 13).
That the contract marked exhbiit A was a part of the
assets of the estate and is the same contract that was turned
over to the attorney for collection (Tr. P. 14).
Cleo K. Beagley, a daughter of the deceased, testified
that she participated in collecting the assets of the estate along
with the rest of the members of the family and went through
their father's belongings and turned the papers over to the
Administrator (Tr. p. 38). And further that they went through
everything, making a thorough search and did not find any
cash (Tr. p. 39). That her family consisted of her and her
sister and two brothers.
At the conclusion of Mrs. Beagley's testimony plaintiff
rested and defendant made a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that a prima facie case had not been proved. The trial judge
ruled "That there was a prima facie case made that the
$4800.00 was not paid. It is not included in the accounts, the
witnesses did not find it, and therefore the motion is denied"
(Tr. p. 43).
Thereupon defendants called Mr. Creel, a handwriting
expert, who testified that the signature on defendants' exhibit
3, the purported receipt, was that of William Kirkham, the
deceased. At this time counsel for defendants stipul,ated that
the handwriting on the remainder of the purported receipt
was not the same handwriting as the signature (Tr. p. 48).
6
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Defendant Orien Spencer was sworn as a witness but was
not allowed to testify as to dealings regarding defendants'
exhibit No. 3 under the so-called "dead man's" statute. Counsel for defendant did not attempt to introduce any competent,
relevant evidence concerning the issue before the court and
thereupon rested.
Plaintiff in rebuttal called Harvard R. Hinton to the
witness stand and he test:fiied that a delinquent contract between
William Kirkham and Orien Spencer and his wife was delivered to him on August 29th or 30th for collection purposes.
That he wrote and mailed a letter on September 1, 1953 to the
defendant Orien Spencer regarding this contract and that
Spencer did not come around to see about it until September
29th (Tr. p. 54, 55).
The court thereafter on its own motion ordered the matter
reopened for further evidence after having taken the case under
advisement. The order of the court came after it had examined
and weighed the evidence presented and was not satisfied
on two points available to the parties. Indicating that this
evidence would be of great assistance to the court in determining the merits of the cause, it ordered the rest of the parties
set aside in order to give the respective parties an opportunity to present evidence on the two points, namely: " ( 1)
Evidence concerning the possession by the defendants of the
sum of $4800.00 in cash which could have been, or which
probably was, paid to deceased on or about the 21st day of
August, 1953. (2) Further evidence of the search by plaintiff
and/or the heirs of the decedent made either before or after
the bringing on of the cause for trial to discover the possession
7
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of $4800.00 in money in the decedent after the 21st day of
August, 1953, including banks in the cities of Lehi, American
Fork, Pleasant Grove, Provo, and Salt Lake City, and a more
detailed search of the premises wherein deceased lived after
August 21, 195;., and any other locations known to the heirs
and representatives of the decedent wherein the said decedent
might have made temporary disposition of $4800.00 paid
to him prior to plaintiff's return from vacation on August 22,
1953."

(

I

The defendants were represented by counsel in court at
the time set for hearing after reopening. Defendants' attorney
suggested that plaintiff's witnesses be heard regarding the new
evidence the plaintiff had to offer (T. p. 66). Later counsel
voiced an objection to plaintiff being allowed to re-open his
case. This motion was denied.
The Administrator Thomas F. Kirkham was recalled to
the witness stand and testified regarding the number of rooms
in decedent's house and that the yard was very small. And
further that since his appointment as administrator he has
never had any statement, letter, or communication whatever,
from any person or institution, indicating that there were any
additional funds in the estate, other than what had been reported (Tr. p. 70, 71).
Letters from 17 banking institutions including American
Fork, Pleasant Grove, Provo, Midvale and Salt Lake City
in Utah and Salt Lake Counties were then placed in evidence
through the testimony of Thomas F. Kirkham, Cleo K. Beagley
and Harvard R. Hinton (Tr. p. 72, 79, 85, 98, 99). All letters
8
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stated that William Kirkham did not have an account in their
institutions.
Cleo Beagley, m testifying of the completeness of the
search conducted in the decedent's home, stated they went
through every room completely, one room at a time, and
searched the contests including cupboards, rugs, bedding and
pillows (Tr. p. 86, 87). That no money, safety deposit keys
or bank statements other than to the Lehi Bank were found.
Mr. Leslie Goates, son-in-law of the deceased, was present
at the time the intensive search was made and he reiterated
what Mrs. Beagley said as to the thoroughness of the search
(Tr. p. 94).
Defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of
prima facie case was again denied (Tr. p. 100). Defendants
were to present their evidence as requested by the Court on
November 6, 1954 at 10:00 a.m.
On November 5, 1954 counsel appeared in court by
stipulation and counsel for defendants rested without presenting further evidence as requested by the court. Counsel for
plaintiff thereupon made a motion to reopen case to present
further evidence, which evidence he had been reserving for
rebuttal purposes and his motion was denied.

·.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Throughout the remainder of this brief plaintiff will be
referred to as respondents and defendants as appellants.
9
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The respondents will argue appellants' points in the order
in which they appear in appellants' brief.

fl

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR TH·E REASON THAT THE
PLAINTIFF PROVED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FOR
THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE PROVED WAS
SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE TO GRANT
THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.
The appellants contend that it was incumbent upon the
part of the respondent to prove the non-payment during the
month of August, 1953 the sum of $4800.00 as an essential
element of their cause of action.
The respondents contend the instant case was an action
for unlawful detainer of real property located at Lehi, Utah.
The allegations and proof of a complaint necessary to
sustain a cause of action for unlawful detainer are clearly set
forth in the following decisions of this court:
Madsen vs. Chournos, 104 U. 280, 139 P. 2nd 225
Buchanan vs. Crites, 106 U. 428, 150 P. 2nd 100, 104
Glenn vs. Keyes, 107 U. 415, 154 P. 2nd 642

I

It is to be noted that all of the allegations of the complaint
on file herein were admitted by the appellants either in their

1l

10
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answer to the complaint or in the stipulations entered into
among the respective parties at the pretrial of the action with
the exception of non-payment.
It is to be further noted that the only issue of fact reserved
for trial as set forth in the pretrial order was stated thus:
"Did the defendants pay to the plaintiff's decedent during the
month of August, 1953 the sum of $4800.00 ?"-a fact that
was raised by the appellants' affirmative defense as set forth
in their answer to the complaint on file herein.

The evidence established by the respondent clearly and
unmistakeably supports the trial court's finding of fact that
the defendant did not pay to the plaintiff's decedent during
the month of August, 1953 the sum of $4800.00.
Said evidence may be summarized as follows:
Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator of the Estate of
William Kirkham, deceased, plaintiff in the case below, testified
that he was a brother of the decedent and that for more than
10 years prior to the death of William Kirkham, deceased,
that he conducted a great deal of decedent's business. He further testified that he made all of the contracts for the decedent,
including the plaintiff's exhibit A. That he made all interest
calculations on contracts for him; that he prepared deeds and
other documents for the decedent and that he did all of his
banking for him. The bank passbook, plaintiff's exhibit C,
was identified by the witness Thomas F. Kirkham as the book
used in making these bank deposits. That book shows that
over 50 deposits were made during the period of 10 years,
the amounts ranging from $17.50, the lowest, to as high as
11
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$6000.00. The decedent died on September 6, 1953. Mr. Harvard R. Hinton, who is an attorney for the plaintiff in this
action, was also counsel for the decedent prior to his death.
In the forepart of August, 1953, Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator herein, departed on a vacation trip, returning on
Saturday, August 22, 1953. In the first part of the week following, the decedent came to the plaintiff administrator and expressed some concern over the delinquencies upon contracts,
specifically mentioning the Spencer contract. Thomas F. Kirkham advised the decedent then to turn his contracts, including
the Spencer contract, over to his attorney and quit worrying
about them. Thereafter, either on August 29th or August 30th,
(after the alleged payment of August 21) the Spencer contract was delivered to Attorney Hinton with instructions to
collect the delinquencies upon the same. Mr. Hinton then on
or about September 1, 1953 wrote a letter to the defendants
concerning their delinquency on this contract but the defendant
did nothing whatsoever about the matter until September
29th (nearly a month later) when they came to see Mr. Hinton
and there for the first time claimed payment of $4800.00.
As has been stated by the appellants in their brief, evidence supporting a claim of non-payment is usually accomplished by the testimony of an obligee that payment was not
made.
In the instant case the obligee, William Kirkham, is dead.
Therefore his actions with respect to the issues of this case after
the date of the alleged payment, August 21, 1953 and prior
·to his decease on September 6, 1953 are of primary importance.
12
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The evidence without conflict shows that the deceased
as far as was ascertainable was in good health all during the
month of August and in the forepart of September, 1953.
He suffered a sudden stroke on the 4th of September, which
rendered him immediately unconscious, resulting in his death
on September 6, 1953. And further evidence shows that the
deceased never at any time requested his brother Thomas F.
Kirkham to prepare a deed for him to be delivered to the
defendants in fulfillment of their contract, and never at any
time did the deceased ask his brother to make interest calculations on the defendants' contract. As a matter of fact, the
evidence as herein stated before, clearly shows that the decedent after the date of the alleged payment and prior to his
decease complained of delinquencies of the Spencer contract
to his brother, who normally conducted all of his business for
him including the preparation of deeds and the calculation of
interest, and delivered said contract to his attorney to collect
said delinquencies. The bank pass book, plaintiff's exhibit C,
further shows that no such sums as claimed by the defendants
to have been paid to the decedent were deposited to his account, and that the decedent did not deliver any such sum of
money to Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator. The evidence
further shows that a complete and thorough search of the
premises wherein the decedent resided and inquiries at seventeen banks in Utah and Salt Lake Counties were made (the
most likely places that the decedent would have deposited
any money if such deposit had been made) and that no
evidence of money, bnk deposit books or safety deposit box
keys was found to indicate that the decedent had ever received the $4800.00 in question.
13
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It is the contention of the respondent that the evidence
of the case clearly supports and proves the allegations of an
unlawful detainer action, including the fact of nonpayment
as shown by the actions of the decedent and testimony of
witnesses during the trial in the lower court.
It is often said that the burden of proof is upon the party
having in form the affirmative allegation, but the burden of
going forward with the proof shifts many times during the
trial from one party to another party. In the instant case the
appellants claim payment as an affirmative defense in their
pleadings; therefore, the burden of going forward to convince the trier of facts that payment was made shifts to the
appellants. The appellants were the parties who presumably
had the peculiar means of knowledge which would enable
them to prove payment but this in fact they failed to do.
All throughout the appellants' brief they have labored
extensively on speculation and fanciful imagination, even quoting statements of the court as to what could have been, or which
probably was, which statements were made prior to the court's
finding and judgment.
The following decisions clearly indicate that such statements have no bearing upon the court's final finding and judgment:
"Oral antecedent expressions of opinion by a trial
court inconsistent with findings, conclusions and decree ultimately rendered in writing do not affect the
final judgment."
In Re Roth's Estate, 269 P 2nd. 278, 2 U. 2nd. 40.

"Oral statements of opinion by the Trial Judge
made in connection with a ruling do not constitute
14
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findings nor judgment and will not modify or affect
them if the ruling, findings, order or judgment is
otherwise sound.''
Wheat v. Denver R. G. & W. RR. Co., 2500 P. 2nd
932.

:~n·

"At the conclusion of the evidence the curt rendered
an oral opinion expressing his views . . . Such opinion
of course is not the decision of the case and may not
be regarded as such ... the decision of a case consists
of the findings, conclusions, and decree; . . . such reasons are not binding on the reviewing Court and may
not be considered as controlling the findings nor as
supplying a want of them,"
Stevens & Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co., 18
P. 2nd 903, 904 81 U. 414.

"Oral statements of opinion by the trial court inconsistent with the findings and conclusions ultimately
rendered do not affect the final judgment."
McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P. 2nd 468, 472.

Also to the same effect, Palfreyman v. Bates & Rogers Construction Co., 108 U. 142, 158 P. 2nd 13·2.

C· •

In the McCollum case the court greatly exceeded the statement of the Court made in the instant case prior to judgment.
in that it orally informed the defendants that it would rule
in defendants' favor, stating that it would not be necessary
for the defedants to procure an additional contemplated witness. It later developed that the court changed its mind and
ruled in favor of the plaintiff even though defendant's contemplated witness died without being given opportunity to
testify and the decision was nevertheless upheld by the
Supreme Court in the following words:

15
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"The fact that the trial court changed his mind and
entered a judgment contrary to his orally announced
decision at the time the case was submitted, cannot be
the basis for overturning the judgment. The only
judgment that can be given effect is the one entered
in acordance with law. * * * no antecedent expressions of the judge can in any way restrict his absolute
power to declare his final conclusion, in the only manner
authorized by law, to wit, by filing his decision (findings of fact and conclusions of law * * *"
McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P. 2nd P. 472
The findings of fact by the trial court pertinent to the
issue in question was that the defendants did not pay to the
plaintiff's decedent during the month of August, 195 3 the
sum of $4800.00. The above stated finding of fact was supported by abundant competent evidence.
A Utah case decided in 1953 held that the Supreme Court
cannot disturb the trial court findings of fact if there is any
competent evidence to support the findings. Seamons vs. Anderson, 252 P. 2nd 209.
Other Utah cases where the same doctrine is applied are:
Beagley vs. U. S. Gypsum Co., 235 P. 2nd 783.
T acea Tsouras vs. Brighton & North Point lrrig Co., 227
P. 2nd 329

I

\

Garrett Freight Lines vs. Cornwall, 232 P. 2nd 786
Williams vs. Ogden Union Ry & Depot Co., 230 P. 2nd 315
It has been further held that:

"The Supreme Court will not redetermine facts
found by the fact finder in a lower court in law cases
16
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if, in the light most favorable to the respondent, the
evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings."
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 256 P 2nd 706.

"On appeal, prevailing party in case at law is entitled to benefit of evidence in light most favorable to
him, together with every inference and intendment
fairly and reasonably arising therefrom."
Nasner v. Burton, 272 P. 2nd. 163, 2 U. 2nd 236.

Also W eenig Bros. v. Manning, 262 P. 2nd, 491, 1 U.
2nd 101.

POINT TWO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE AND FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS ATER BOTH PARTIES HAD RESTED SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON THAT
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A
JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTD BY THE DEFENDANTS WAS NOT PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT AND WAS REFUTED
BY THE PLAINTIFF.

'.

What we have stated under Point One is also applicable
to Point Two.
The appellants contend that by the introduction of defendants' exhibit No. 3 they had proved a prima facie case of
payment and that the respondents did not offer any scintilla
of evidence to rebut the exhibit.
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Respondents deny appellants' contention on both counts.
The case of Gallaher vs. T heilbar Realties, 18 P. 2nd 1101,
93 Mont. 421, cited by the appellants in support of their argument may be distinguished from the case at hand in that
the court was called upon to determine as a matter of law
whether or not the uncontradicted evidence to the effect that
an individual agreed to settle in court an account by paying
part thereof in cash and giving his personal note for the balance, and that the other party upon receipt of the cash and
note voluntarily receipted the statement of the account,· constituted payment. Whereas in the instant case the appellants
are asking this court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence of respondents which was most certainly abundant and
contradictory to that of the appellants.
The evidence recited in Point One pertaining to the circumstances and conduct of the deceased after the date of the
alleged payment and prior to the date of his decease; the
failure of the defendants or appellants to reply to a demand
for payment or to make any statement whatsoever for over
a month after the alleged payment; the testimony of Thomas
F. Kirkham, Administrator of the Estate of William Kirkham,
deceased, relating to the Spencer contract; the bank deposit
books; the testimony of the heirs relating to the search of
decedent's belongings; the testimony of Attorney Harvard
R. Hintor and all other evidence submitted on behalf of the
respondents clearly contradict and rebut the so-called evidence
of defendants' exhibit No. 3.
The physical evidence of defendants' exhibit No. 3 shows
that the signature only was in decedent's handwriting and it
18
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was stipulated by the appellants that the body of this exhibit
was not in the decedent's handwriting. As a matter of fact,
the signature and body were written by different pencils as
well as by different hands.
The trial court in its analysis of the case states, "It is
more than passing strange, that where a receipt is written in
lead pencil, at a time when $4800.00 was being paid, that the
payor, or someone in his behalf would use one pencil to make
the body of the receipt, and the signer would then use another
pencil in signing his name thereto."

t an~

:eo:·

:r:.::

There was not one scintilla of evidence offered by the
appellants concerning their exhibit No. 3 with relation to anything other than the signature. There was no evidence presented concerning the drafting of this exhibit, the place of
payment, means of payment, or any evidence whatsoever surrounding this exhibit other than the signature.
When the physical facts of this exhibit are considered in
light of the facts determined by the evidence as presented in
Point One and elsewhere throughout this brief, speculation
as to what might have been or which was probably done ceases
to be. We are then left with the findings of fact by the court
that the claimed payment of $4800.00 was never paid, and
that the receipt, defendants' exhibit No. 3·, even though it
bears the true signature of the decedent (which gives full
credit to defendants' only evidence) is false, forged and counterfeit, which findings are clearly supported by abundant,
competent evidence.
Appellants certa~nly did not prove by any preponderance
of evidence a genuineness of any receipt. The findings by the
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court based on competent evidence that defendants' exhibit
No. 3 is false, forged and counterfeit places the appellants'
arguments concerning a so-called "receipt" outside of the scope
of the issues before this court as all of appellants' arguments
presuppose a valid receipt whereas a genuine receipt supported
by evidence never existed, as was determined by the court.
The Utah cases cited under Point One holding that the
Supreme Court cannot disturb the trial court's finding of fact
if there is any competent evidence to support the findings is also
applicable here.
A very recent Utah case, Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator
Supplies Co., 272 P. 2nd 583, 2 U. 2nd 289, states:
"On appeal from judgment for plaintiffs, Supreme
Court was required to take all the evidence and every
reasonable inference therefrom in light most favorable
to plaintiffs."

* The general rule is that a verdict willl not be set
aside on the ground of insufficiency of evidence if the
evidence substantially supports it. "There must be
an absence of evidence against the defendants
or a decided preponderance in his favor. In other
words, the v erdict must be plainly wrong and manifestly against the weight of the evidence to warrant
the court in setting it aside."
People v. Swasey, 6 U. 93, 21 P 400

Also see United States v. Brown, 6 U., 115, 21 P. 461
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POINT THREE
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-OPENING THE
CASE ON ITS OWN MOTION AND IN DESIGNATING
THE MANNER, KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE
THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE COURT.
The mere fact that appellants have been unable to find
authorities to support the action of the court in matters of
reopening the case where the initiating source was the court
itself certainly does not make it an abuse of discretion on the
part of the court.
That a judge has no burden or duty to call forth evidence
is plain in the law. But the general judicial power itself, expressly allotted in every st ate constitution impries inherently
a power to investigate as auxiliary to the power to decide; and
the power to investigate implies necessarily the power to
summon and to question witnesses. If the court has such inherent power then the power to reopen a case on its own
motion in order to make a proper judicial determination certainly must be one of its inherent powers.
Respondent agrees with the appellants that a broad latitude and discretion is allowed the trial court in reopening a
case.
Appellants' contention that a motion to reopen is always
made by one of the parties and is ordinarily based on newly
discovered evidence is not shared by the respondent.
It was held in Holn vs. Pauly, 106 P. 266, 11 Cal. App. 724,

"Where, after submission, the judge, after suggesting it himself, reopened the case for further evidence,
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it will be presumed that it was in furtherance of a
desire to reach a just conclusion upon the merits, and,
both parties having the same opportunity to offer additional evidence, he will be deemed to have acted within
his discretion, especially where it is at least doutbful
whether the additional evidence strengthens materially
the successful party's case."
That a court may of its own motion reopen a case is
implied from the following:
·'Where the court reopens the case on motion, the
character of the showing made in support of the
motion is immaterial, since the court may, of its own
motion, reopen the case." 88 Corpus Juris Secundum,
220 par. 104.
See also Badoner vs. Guaranty Trust, etc., Bank, 200 P.
638; and Rutledge vs. Barger, 255 P. 537.
That the court did not abuse its discretion could not be
more clearly stated than the following statement from 88
Corpus Juris Secundum 222, par. 106:
"It cannot be considered an abuse of discretion to
reopen a case for further evidence where the adverse
party suffers no injustice, or where the court permits
him the same latitude in introducing further evidence
where it is necessary to reopen to supply evidence
material to the case and necessary for its proper disposition, or where the evidence is newly discovered."

Mohawk Carpet Mills v. State, 17 N. Y. 2nd 780
Chapman v. Associated Transport, 63 S.E. 2nd 465.
How can the appellants contend they were harmed or
prejudiced when they were granted the same opportunties
and latitudes as the respondents. The fact that they did not
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avail themselves of this opportunity was not prejudicial to
their interest when they were granted the same rights and
privileges as were the respondents.
There is no conflict as to the broad latitude and discretion
allowed a trial court in matters of reopening a case.
The appellants contend that there was a clear abuse of
discretion in that the Court itself initiated the reopening of
the case in order to hear further evidence necessary to the
ends of justice.
An appellate court will interfere only where there has
been a clear abuse of discretion. How can there be such a clear
abuse when the sole purpose of reopening was in the furtherance of the interest of justice and both parties given equal opportunities to offer evidence and be heard ?
A judge is not a mere passive figure who must rely solely
upon the actions of attorneys for his determinations. He may
even on his own call forth witnesses and interrogate them
in order that the ends of justice may be met.
The following excerpts from 53 Am. fur. 109-110, Sec.
123, 124, state very clearly the broad discretion allowed a trial
court in matters of reopening a case:
''While a party should in gtvmg his evidence in
chief, offer all evidence at his command in support
of his case, and as a general rule is thereafter confined to rebutting evidence, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court in the furtherance of the
interests of justice after the parties have rested to
permit either party to reopen a case, for the purpose
of receiving further evidence. . . . In the discretion
of the Court a case may be reopened and additional
23·
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evidence introduced after a motion for a nonsuit or
for a directed verdict, after a demurrer to the evidence has been made, or during argument of counsel,
even after the conclusion of the argument. The exigencies of each particular case go far in controlling
the discretion of the court in this regard, although it
has been said that the court should not reopen a case
except for good reasons and on proper showing, it
is not, on the other hand, justified in closing the case
until all the evidence, offered in good faith and necessary to the ends of justice, has been heard.
" ... An appellate court will interfere only where
there has been a clear abuse of discretion."
"It is common practice for the trial court to allow
the case to be reopened and additional evidence introduced in order to prevent a nonsuit, where counsel for
the plaintiff has omitted evidence by accident, inadvertence, or even because of a mistake as to the necessity fo.~ offering a particular witness or particular evidence.
It is further stated in 88 C. J. S. 224 Sec. 108 that:
"It is within the sound discretion of the Court
whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened
for the further introduction of evidence after a motion
or request for a nonsuit, to set aside the verdict, directed verdict, judgment, dismissal, peremptory instruction, or a demurrer to the evidence,· or withdrawal
of the case from the jury, and the case may be reopened
after the court has announced its intention as to its
ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has
granted it, or has denied it, or after the motion has
been granted, if the order has not been written, or
entered on the minutes or signed. In the exercise of
this discretion the court should reopen the case to
receive evidence inadvertently omitted, or evidence
the admission of which is necessary for the proper and
just disposition of the case."
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The appellants contend that the attorney is the best
judge of what evidence he desires the court to hear.
But is is discretionary with the court what further evidence it will hear after the case has been reopened. 88 C.J.S.,
226, par. 110. Aling v. Weissman, 59 A. 419.
In view of the broad powers granted to a trial court to
further the ends of justice and the fact that the appellants were
not prejudiced by the court's order or denied equal opportunities
with the respondents, there can be no such clear abuse of
discretion which would justify interference by an appellate
court.
The evidence offered after the reopening of the case was
clearly in the furtherance of justice to enable the trial court
to render a just and proper decision. The fact that the appellants
did not avail themselves of their opportunity to offer evidence
does not render the trial court action a clear abuse of discretion.

POINT FOUR
'c

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON
THE ERRORS OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE COURT.
The decision or judgment of the trial court was supported
by sufficient legal evidence to justify the same and it was according to law.
There were no errors of law occurring at the trial which
would be prejudicial to the plaintiffs.

A recent Utah case, Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 249 Pac. (2nd) 514, states:
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''The matter of granting or refusing a new trial
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the
judgment thereon should be reversed only when there
has been a plain abuse of said discretion."
Other Utah cases holding to the same effect are: Callahan
v. Simmons, 64 Utah 250, 228 P. 892; Lund v. District Court,
90 Utah 433, 62 P. 2nd. 278; Hepworth v. Covey, 97 Utah
205, 91 P. 2nd. 507.
In Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 269 P 2nd 867,
2 U. 2nd 104, it was held that:
"Trial courts have wide latitude in granting or denying motions for new trial."
"Order overruling motion for new trial must stand
unless it is made affirmatively to appear that trial
court erred."
Moulton v. Staats, 83 U. 197, 27 P 2nd 45.

What we have stated about the other points also applies
to Point Four.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the Lower
Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GLENN M. ACOMB
and
HARVARD R. HINTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondents.
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